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Rina Kusumawati

Indonesia correspondent — Nickel and critical minerals, export policy, and archipelago trade routes. Signed columns, each an argument; the views are the correspondent’s own.

Opinion — the views in these columns are the correspondent’s own.

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Portrait of Rina Kusumawati

Indonesia correspondent · Based in Jakarta

Nickel and critical minerals, export policy, and archipelago trade routes.

Career

Rina Kusumawati covers the metals that will decide the next fifty years, from the country that has decided to stop selling them raw. An economics graduate of Universitas Indonesia, she joined the commodities desk of an English-language newspaper in Jakarta in her early twenties and never left the beat — Surabaya for the ports and the smelters, Singapore for the traders who price what the ports ship.

She made her reputation on the nickel story. When Jakarta banned raw nickel-ore exports, most of the world's press wrote it as a trade dispute; Kusumawati wrote it as an industrial revolution, reported from the ground. She spent weeks in Sulawesi's smelter towns — the heat, the migrant dormitories, the Chinese engineers, the Javanese welders — and her dispatches explained, before the analysts did, what the ban was really building: not just leverage, but an entire downstream economy.

What shaped her lens: the idea that resource nationalism is not an ideology but a negotiation tactic, and that the archipelago's 17,000 islands are 17,000 different trade policies wearing one flag. Her defining episode: a night spent on a coal barge crossing the Makassar Strait during a 2022 export-permit freeze, filing by satellite phone while the crew debated whether the cargo would be legal by morning. "Commodities," she says, "are the only beat where the story can change while the ship is still moving."

Based in Jakarta, she covers nickel and critical minerals, export policy, and archipelago trade.

Personal

Rina Kusumawati grew up in Surabaya, the daughter of a civil servant and a batik trader, in a house fragrant with wax and indigo. She is single, with no children, and lives in Kemang, Jakarta, in a small house with a garden she tends badly but lovingly. She is a certified scuba diver and vanishes to the reefs of eastern Indonesia whenever the assignment calendar allows. Javanese, Indonesian, and English are all spoken at home — Javanese for her mother on the phone, Indonesian for everything practical, English for the work that follows her everywhere.

Timeline

  • 2013 — Economics degree, Universitas Indonesia
  • 2014–2017 — Commodities reporter, English-language press, Jakarta
  • 2018–2020 — Ports and industry correspondent, Surabaya
  • 2021–2024 — Commodities and trade correspondent, Singapore
  • 2026 — Correspondent for critical minerals, Magna Bureau
Opinion Nickel & export policy

Seventeen Thousand Islands, One Policy

Indonesia is seventeen thousand islands, three hundred ethnic groups, and — since the nickel ban — exactly one industrial policy that the whole world was forced to read.

The move was simple, and that was the genius of it. For decades we shipped raw nickel ore abroad — the rock left, the value stayed overseas, and Jakarta collected the royalties of a quarry. Then the government did the arithmetic out loud: the world's batteries need our nickel; the smelters can be built here; the jobs can be ours. So the ore stopped leaving. Build the smelter in Sulawesi, or buy nothing. The polite word for this is “downstreaming.” The impolite word, used in several Western capitals, I will not repeat here — but it rhymed with the sound of a door closing.

The reactions were instructive. Brussels took us to the WTO, defending the sacred principle that raw materials must flow freely — freely, that is, toward European factories. The lecture about free trade arrived from the continent of agricultural subsidies; we filed it carefully. The Eastern buyers, meanwhile, did not lecture at all — they built the smelters, took the offtake, and asked for more. Everyone revealed their position. The West wanted the ore. The East wanted the metal. Indonesia, for the first time, wanted the margin.

“For decades the rock left and the value stayed overseas. We simply asked: what if the value stayed home?”

Is it working? The smelters rose — some cleaner than others, and the environmental bill is real and must be paid honestly. The export revenues shifted from rock to metal. The model is being studied from Lusaka to Lima: the quiet triumph of a country that stopped apologizing for owning things. Seventeen thousand islands are hard to govern and harder to lecture. We tried being the quarry. We prefer being the kitchen. The policy fits on one page. The results are still being written — in steel, this time, not in ore.

To understand the audacity, read the colonial ledger. The Dutch kept excellent books: first the spices, then the oil, then the timber — four centuries of extraction, itemized. Independence in 1945 changed the cashier, not the model; the ore carriers simply flew a new flag. Generations of economists wrote the resource-curse textbooks about countries like ours, solemnly explaining why the ground’s wealth never reached the people — written, invariably, by people who never had to sell the ore. The nickel ban was Jakarta’s first serious edit to that textbook, written in the only language the market respects: supply.

The arithmetic, once done out loud, was devastating. Raw nickel ore: a commodity price, a royalty, a hole in the ground. Nickel pig iron: multiples of that, and the furnace jobs. Battery-grade nickel sulfate: another multiple, and the chemical engineers. The finished battery: the whole ladder, and the industrial future. For decades we sold the ladder and bought back the climb — importing the stainless steel, importing the batteries, importing our own geology at a markup. Downstreaming is simply the decision to keep a rung. The West calls it protectionism. The West also kept its own rungs, centuries ago, with gunboats. We used a regulation.

Go to Morowali, on the eastern coast of Sulawesi, and watch the policy glow. The industrial park there — anchored by Chinese capital, staffed increasingly by Indonesian engineers — runs furnaces through the tropical night, turning red earth into metal under a haze of steam and ambition. Fishing villages became smelter towns in a decade; the warungs now serve shift workers at 3 a.m. It is the most consequential industrial bet in Southeast Asia, and it was placed with a single instrument: the refusal to sell cheap what the world desperately needs. The offtake contracts stretch years into the future. The rock, at last, has a forwarding address: home.

Brussels, naturally, chose the courtroom. The WTO complaint — filed in defense of the sacred free flow of raw materials toward European factories — produced a panel ruling against Jakarta in 2022. Indonesia appealed, into the void: the Appellate Body has been paralyzed for years, its judges unappointed, its docket a museum. The case now sits in legal purgatory, which is precisely where Jakarta wanted it. The lesson was not lost on the seventeen thousand islands: the rules were written by the quarry’s customers, adjudicated by the quarry’s customers, and enforced — when convenient — against anyone who stops being a quarry.

“The rules of free trade were written by the quarry’s customers. We stopped reading them.”

The West’s countermoves have been equally revealing. The European Critical Raw Materials Act promises diversification and resilience — noble words, thin geology. Washington’s clean-energy subsidies, meanwhile, carry a foreign-entity-of-concern clause that quietly fences Indonesian nickel out of the American EV supply chain, on the grounds that the smelters were built with Chinese money. Consider the exquisite irony: they want supply chains without China, and the metal they need is processed in Chinese-built furnaces on Indonesian soil. The decoupling architects drew beautiful diagrams. The diagrams did not include Sulawesi.

Honesty, however, requires the other ledger — the environmental bill, which is real and must be paid without euphemism. The tailings in the bays, the forests cleared on Obi Island, the coal-fired furnaces: the battery in the Berlin electric car begins in a Sulawesi furnace, and the green transition’s first chapter is written in smoke. Pretending otherwise would make us lecturers, and we have enough of those. The smelters must get cleaner, the tailings must be managed, the forests must be accounted for — because the kitchen, unlike the quarry, cannot outsource its conscience. Owning the value chain means owning its costs. That is the price of the margin, and we intend to pay it.

And the imitators are already circling. The bauxite export ban followed; copper concentrate restrictions tightened; the Philippines — the other nickel giant — debates its own downstreaming law in Manila’s endless committee rooms. Further afield, Chile argues over lithium nationalization and the Democratic Republic of Congo weighs its cobalt leverage: from Lusaka to Lima, the playbook circulates, translated into local grievances. Call it commodity nationalism if you must; the practitioners call it arithmetic. A quiet wave is moving through the Global South, and its slogan fits on a bumper sticker: the rock stays until the value does.

Seventeen thousand islands, three hundred ethnic groups, one policy — and the policy worked because it was simple enough to survive the archipelago’s beautiful chaos. We tried being the quarry for the better part of a century, and the quarry made us poor with rich ground. We prefer being the kitchen now: messier, hotter, infinitely more profitable. The lecture circuit will continue — Brussels has lawyers, Washington has clauses — but the furnaces are already lit, the contracts already signed, the engineers already trained. The policy fits on one page. The results are still being written — in steel, this time, not in ore.

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